Religious Liberalism

2009-10-02T17:10:00.000-07:00

On Models and Model Building

Today model building is the preferred method of research in fields as otherwise diverse as investment banking and climatology. Experts in the various disciplines are zealously convinced of the efficacy of their models. Such reliance on models has proven disastrous in the past.

From 1930s to 1970s macro-economists built enormously complex models of economic systems designed to serve as basis for long term economic planning. Psychologically the models were impressive in that they gave people the illusion of knowledge and control. Unfortunately, those models didn’t work except perhaps to provide employment and professional advancement for cadres of economists. A macro-economic model consists of a series of equations, a set of variables, and a list of relations between those variables expressed by coefficients of the model. Although the original in-put out-put equations may have been created by means of observations of a functioning market-based economy, once fixed into the model, empirical and theoretical in-puts became conceptually redundant. The model itself became a black-box mechanism for formulating and implementing policy. And, according to developmental economist Michael Todaro such plans provided important psychological benefits in "mobilizing popular sentiment and cutting across tribal factions with the plea to all citizens to 'work together,'” so that an “enlightened central government, through its economic plan, [could] provide the needed incentive to overcome the inhibiting forces of traditionalism in the quest for widespread material progress." Reliance on such models by central governments was often disastrous for developing economies.

In fact, despite the solemn assurances of the experts, these models proved to have very little explanatory power or predictive power. They relied equations which were themselves time and place dependent. At best they represented snapshots of a particular economy at particular times although they were used to predict the behavior of other economies at other times. Not only were macro-economists unable to predict the state of an economy ten years out, they were rarely able to predict the state of an economy ten weeks out.

With the enormous computing capability of computers and advances in statistical analysis models have become more and more sophisticated although they may in fact be based on very little theory and relatively few well chosen empirical observations. Linked to computer graphics, today’s models are as beautiful, as impressive, and as entertaining as Star Wars battle scenes. We seem to quite literally see the world developing before our eyes. Nevertheless, the fundamental logic of model building has not changed. In many respects Google Earth is the finest of models. Its empirical content is many times more solid than the empirical content of global warming models. Nevertheless, while Google Earth can tell us a great deal about Portland Oregon today or even tomorrow it cannot tell us a great deal about Portland Oregon 50 years from now. Such snapshots can give us no very dependable method of predicting the future and thus formulating and implementing rational policy.

Population growth models based on data from 1950 -1970 is inapplicable to population growth patterns in 2009. Investment banking models were based on data from 1945 - 2005 during which time single family housing prices in aggregate increased. The models based on these data predicted that single home mortgages in aggregate had less than a 1% chance risk of default. As a result neither the government nor the investment houses required margins for trading in these aggregated mortgages and their derivatives and the derivatives of their derivatives. The unintended consequences of these models led to an enormous multiplication of liquidity and astronomic growth in leverage and thus M3 – which has not been measured in three years. Financial collapse was certain but not predictable from within these particular models. According to Freeman Dyson of Princeton, almost all funding in global warming research is now being devoted to model building and relatively little funding has been devoted to actually determining what is happening in the real world.

The results of this reliance in climatology on models rather than on observation, experiment, and theory is as likely to be as disappointing as similar reliance on econometric models was in the mid twentieth century and investment banking models which led to our current financial collapse. Believers in these climate change models, in particular, are becoming increasingly dogmatic. No countervailing opinions even from within a particular disciplines are allowed to undermine the faith in the model itself. Critics are castigated as heretics. Unlike genuinely scientific theories like Newtonian mechanics, these models cannot be tested. The models create the appearance of precision by the magic of long division, but there is little real precision in their predictive ability more than two or three weeks out. When the model builders encounter facts which seem to contradict the predictions of they invariably tinker with the model and announce that the model simply needed a little adjusting. The proponents of these models will not admit even the possibility of being fundamentally in error. Too much seems to be at stake.

A model is not a theory. A genuine scientific theory is a net which addresses, at best, only certain aspects of reality. In its essence a theory is a simplification and so while its powers to explain are high, its ability to predict is limited except in very controlled conditions. What the theory cannot interpret in its terms, it must ignore. A sophisticated theorist will recognize the limitations of any particular theory. Today’s model builders, in contrast, believe that they have somehow reproduced reality and in their zeal they are often able to use “enlightened central governments” “to mobilize public sentiment” in their various causes.

2007-11-26T14:45:00.001-08:00

Two little news items.

Littler: There's an interesting blog reflection on Liberty up at the Kenyon Review.

Bigger: Speaking of Reflections, Chana has just come out with another book - Reflections on the Logic of the Good. Liberty is just a case study of the ideas in this work (which actually precedes Liberty). It is the sort of fundamental philosophical study which you just don't see much anymore. A MUST read in my totally unbiased opinion :)

2007-07-19T19:44:00.000-07:00

More Iraq discussion:

Overwhelming evidence of failure now? Or sometime in the future?

It has been four years and about 3800 American lives. Military spending is a lower percentage of GDP than the early Clinton years. The US is involved in a war that by traditional standards might not even be considered a war. It certainly isn't a Vietnam.

We are willing to run from Iraq. But looking historically, the country is doing better than those that were targeted under our 'War on Drugs.' Colombia was an incredibly violent place for decades - with the one distinction being that no one cared. The US continued to support the country and now, finally, it is recovering. Such a thing didn't happen overnight, and wouldn't have without our support - through many many setbacks. War is a very very difficult business. But we should really give up on all international efforts if 4 years of difficulty will stop us cold. The War on Poverty or Drugs should have been given up many many many years ago on this measure.

Consider: Rio has a murder rate that is almost the same as Iraq. Few people consider Rio to be in a civil war. There is, effectively, a war afoot there - but nobody is asking the Brazilian government to pull away. In fact, it has taken time, but they've cut that rate by some 20% over the last 10 years. However, Brazil and Colombia, for all their issues, aren't nearly as important as Iraq.

The war in Iraq is quite interesting because it is a war of ideas - not of territory. The other side's goal is to maintain chaos and death so that the US will withdraw and the IDEA of US power and dedication to freedom will be forever shattered. This is why Iran is funding both the Sunni and Shia terrorists. They want chaos. This was the strategy laid down by Zarqawi before he was killed - his correspondance calling for it was clear. This is why they bombed the Samarra Mosque (which kicked off the upswing in violence we're still in). The US desire, on the other hand, is to deliver peace under a free government. We don't need to hold the territory either - just pacify it. Failure to do so will be roughly equivalent to withdrawing from Beirut. It will be a clear sign of weakness and it will generate a monster down the road.

It has become far clearer recently that the bulk of Iraqis support the American side of the equation. They may not like America, but they don't want chaos. Moqtada and the Accord Front both rejoined Parliament today. The Sunni tribesman have launched attacks on al Qaeda in lots of their territory. Even Moqtada has stepped away some from his Iranian backers. The locals aren't happy with the violence. The American surge, while INCREDIBLY young, has helped in some areas. The very concept that we will surge has provided support and confidence for our friends to stand up to the terrorists. Not much though, as the Senate and House push for retreat. Mosul isn't suddenly being bombed because people in Mosul have decided to start killing each other. It has suddenly been bombed because people who aren't from there are moving their activities from their 'home bases.' The goons and the gangs are being displaced, but are trying to carry their party elsewhere. This really is progress. The locals in Mosul know their neighbors aren't behind the campaign, and so while it can kill many it will be much harder for it to create war between groups. But it won't be done in 3 months.

The way I see it, the goal isn't to unite Iraq or solve the Sunni/Shia conflict. Such things are indeed beyond us. As I wrote in an earlier conversation (and from here I'm quoting an earlier conversation), the key is to change the methods by which the battle is fought. (see the below message)

2007-07-17T19:27:00.000-07:00

From a conversation with a left-wing German colleague at work:

The Americans aren't going to solve the Shia-Sunni conflict. I don't think they need to. The key is to change the methods by which the battle is fought.

There was a classic European author (I can't remember who) who said that the reason there was religious peace in Amsterdam had nothing to do with a lack of desire of individual groups to control and direct others. It had to do with the fact that there was a multiplicity of groups - none of whom had the power to dominate. Peace was not through the elimination of faction, but through the multiplication of it. Faction is multiplying in Iraq. There are quite a few parties, the Shia aren't all aligned with each other and neither are the Sunni. Before long, the locals will realize there's no purpose to the fight. This is why the Sunni tribesmen have turned against Al-Qaeda and the other militants in a big way. The fight is being sustained, not by Iraqis, but by foreign fighters - foreign fighters who have no problem killing lots of civilians just to maintain chaos. This was the strategy laid down by Zarqawi before he was killed - his correspondance calling for it was clear. Iran is doing the same thing. If these guys can be slowed down (and I think they can, once civilians can see that America isn't withdrawing and they and their families won't be killed if they resist), then the country will settle into being a very contentious, somewhat liberal, democratic state.

The American role isn't to bring peace to both sides. It is to provide the support necessary to allow a political/religious marketplace to develop. It is like the accumulation of wealth. You can get wealth by stealing it or forcing others to give it to you (the main method for a long time) or you can get wealth by creating value. The market serves as a mechanism to enable the latter approach at the expense of the earlier one. The Americans can provide the conditions, by fighting extremist groups, for this sort of political market to emerge. If this sort of political marketplace can emerge ANYWHERE in the Arab world, it will be tremendously positive for all of us. The example can be greatly helpful to all Arab peoples living under the twin impositions of totalitarian dictatorship or the potential rise of the Muslim Brotherhood. The Arab world trails even Africa in terms of education, for example. There are real problems, but they don't need to be that bad. The Arab world can be a much more pleasent place - and it has been. Muslim countries can succeed in having this sort of marketplace. For all it's problems, Turkey isn't such a bad place. If they had nukes, I wouldn't care. Iran can also have this sort of marketplace - and under liberal leadership I wouldn't care whether they had nukes. Lebanon wasn't too bad prior to the civil war - it was long-term flaws in their constitution that brought them down.

If there can be a marketplace of ideas within the Arab world, the export of a tremendously destructive vision can be brought to an end.

2007-07-10T16:39:00.000-07:00

Check out shirenetworknews.net. It is a very well produced and thoroughly enjoyable satirical look at the news of the week - combined with a strong interview with a newsmaker. They certainly have a slant (and a fixation on religious totalitarianism), but it is very well done. Enjoy!

2007-03-28T17:52:00.000-07:00

The below was written in response to a WSJ article on Blinder:

After reading Pain From Free Trade... I have a few thoughts to share with you.

First, Blinder and other economists (and even people in the workforce) tend to focus on categories of jobs that can't be offshored due to person-to-person or on-site requirements. I think this is actually a poor long-term tool for predicting the dynamics of job movement. A great deal of technology is focused on enabling remote delivery of a variety of these services (think remote surgery). Furthermore, highly skilled people in these trades can come to the U.S. and displace locals just as they might do from a distance.

In my opinion, the 'American difference' has never been about the quality of our education (we tend to score poorly on standard tests) or the protections at our borders. It has to do with two more fundamental components: the style of our education and the flexibility of our social, economic & political systems.

The vast majority of countries train people for specific jobs - from dentists to landscapers. Education is far more focused far earlier than it is in the U.S.. These people become the classic cogs in their societies' great economic machines. In the U.S., our educational system has a fundamentally different goal. The liberal arts education, and the late specialization, are both designed to teach Americans how to learn. Where others are cogs, we are oil. We change careers often and this is fundamentally built into our educational DNA. We may not be as strong as others in particular fields, but we are far better at filling the cracks as new opportunities are created - or as we create them.

Our educational system does not stand alone in this characteristic. Our entire society is built on flexibility. We honor trailblazers in all fields, including the ones they create. This flexibility is what makes our economy so dynamic. It is why we have sustained our growth where others like Japan or most European countries have faltered. Economists love to paint long-term pictures of the economic future. But these paintings are even less reliable than long-term weather forecasts. They necessarily fail to take into account the unpredictable changes that will roll through the global economy because of human ingenuity and the ever shifting web of circumstance. A directed economy scores well - until these uncertainties add up - and then an economic shudder runs through the entire system.

Government policy should not encourage particular positions or training. It shouldn't shut down competition in certain fields. Inevitable change will only be more painful if it is resisted. A billion small changes, spread over decades, are easier to handle than a few massive ones caused by the bankruptcy of a anachronistic system. France is a great example of this. Government policy should ensure that our legal, educational, health and other basic systems are dynamic enough to handle whatever may come. In most cases this will involve tapping the creativity of the private sector. The quality that will enable the middle-class American to continue to prosper is their inherent flexibility, and the flexibility of the system that has been created around them. The strains arise where these systems have fallen far behind the needs and strengths of the modern world (think Social Security when compared with Australian Superannuation).

There will be economic pain with change - but sticking our heads in the mud and resisting that change will only make it all the worse when it comes.

Take a look at the show on www.religiousliberalism.org for a wonderful, historical, take on all of this. It starts from the very basic political history of our American system and expands to talk about economics and just about everything else.

Thank you,

Joseph Cox

2006-12-21T23:56:00.000-08:00

I had the opportunity to discuss the Baker proposal with a friend of a friend who knew people on the commission. As a general rule – it is far easier to tear down than to build up. We need constructive advice now – and so I did my best.
Here are my comments:

****
First off, I'm not criticizing Baker's thoughtfulness or thoroughness. When you define your intellectual approach to a problem - from the very start - you prejudice the result. In essence, you can box yourself in simply by defining yourself as a realist.

Let me lay out my intellectual approach to this issue. First, I absolutely agree that diplomacy is critical. But with certain people, it will be ineffective and that must be understood from the get-go. That doesn't mean there aren't other, positive effects.

The comparison is often made with the situation in North Korea. There, we have actively considered only diplomacy. Quite frankly, there is absolutely nothing militarily we can do with Kim Jong Il. Of course, knowing that the key to his power and longevity is nuclear weaponry, Kim Jong Il has never negotiated in good faith. He has a target, he is paranoid, and nothing we can offer him will deter him. Have the talks thus been useless? In fact, they haven't. We've forged much stronger partnerships and levels of understanding with South Korea, Japan and even China. Long term, China is the solution to the problem. They alone can eliminate the regime and threat of Kim Jong Il. For now, North Korea is a problem because they want it to be. Diplomacy can alleviate their need to have a foil in the region. In reality, we are negotiating with the Chinese.

Looking at Iran, we have another group that will never negotiate in good faith. We can offer Kim Jong Il food and fuel. But Iran's economy, while weak, is far stronger than North Korea's. They won't be deterred by economic measures short of a blockade.
I believe that within the Iranian regime there are two groups.

1) Those who use Islam as an excuse and mechanism for power. They have supported nuclear weapons research because, like Kim Jong Il, they see it as key to their own longevity. They are realists - much like the 'communist' leadership of the later days of the USSR. It is highly unlikely they would use such weapons against other countries.

2) The true believers. They would willingly destroy Israel and are doing everything in their power to create popular support for that position - in order to force the realists to go along with them. It is their holy mission.

So how do we tackle this situation? There are several possible methods:

1) Diplomacy.

It is, I believe, almost a non-starter as far as being a cure.
The other side, whether realist or Islamist, aren't negotiating in good faith. The bomb is absolutely critical to them. Diplomacy is, nonetheless, an opportunity to strengthen our other alliances. If we do negotiate with them, we shouldn't seek their acquiescence. Rather, we should have multi-party talks, with Israel, Turkey, Iraq, Iran, Pakistan, Afghanistan, the Gulf States etc... We can use negotiations to strengthen our position with these parties - and even more critically, give them an opportunity to find common ground on Iran with one another. Israel is especially important here. It is a chance to get Israel off the agenda – and they are the most threatened of all.

So, diplomacy is useful, but not a cure for the problem. Note, we shouldn't be talking about Iraq. Iran and the bomb are the issue - we know they have been funding terrorism in Iraq. The Shia groups in Iraq are to Iran what North Korea is to China - a thorn in our side. We need that funding to dry up, and Iran won't agree to that. It isn't in their interest.

2) Do we accept the realists getting the bomb, in the hope that the Islamists won't get power down the line?

That seems like an extremely dangerous position - especially since the Islamists are the ones in power now and don't look (yesterday's elections notwithstanding) like they will be backing down any time soon.

3) Do we pursue all-out-war?

I think this is a non-starter as well. Iraq is a far better place to fight than Iran. The territory favors us greatly. And if attacked, Iranian nationalism will make our lives very difficult. Unlike Iraq, they have a true and long-standing nationalist tradition. So boots on the ground or even air force action won't do us any good. It will strengthen those perceived to be standing up to us.

4) Do we try to close the borders with Iran?

This is nearly impossible - and more critically - does nothing about the bomb.

5) Support revolutionary groups?

This is absolutely critical. And I have very good sources telling me we are doing a pathetic job of this. This is the ideal solution. In effect, it is negotiating with the Iranian people and not the 'leadership.' They are certainly trying it with us (letters to the American people, their allies like Chavez talking to our people etc...) It is a very very important path to pursue.

6) Blockade?

If the revolutionary approach doesn't work, we need to blockade them. It may not make many friends in Iran - but it WILL fix up Iraq, Lebanon and Syria due to the lack of Iranian cash. With weaker Shia groups, we can get the Saudis to dial back the Sunni groups. This will also free up our military resources. It could have positive impact on the nuke issue too. The realists may like their power, but they also like the luxuries that come with it. And there are enough of them that they might actually need a partially functional economy to maintain those luxuries (unlike North Korea). If this works as a tool to get them to slap the Islamists down, then we will have not only won a temporary reprieve - we will have established a mechanism for reward and punishment in the future.

So, my recommendation is start multi-party diplomacy, support revolution and blockade as a last resort. If Iraq is our first concern, and not the bomb, then blockade earlier rather than later - and clearly connect that action with Iranian action in Iraq. This will dampen nationalist backlash - as we are only doing the blockade in reaction to foreign adventures.

As a final area, it is easy to say support revolution. But actually doing it is another issue. In Iran there are a number of major issues:

1) The Iranian revolutionary groups are widely seen as incompetent and as busy tearing into each other as the regime. They would make great political parties in a post-revolutionary era - but they are not an effective revolutionary force at this point.

2) The Islamist brownshirts permanently maim those who dare to protest. And they do not mind fighting a losing battle or hurting innocent civilians. That said, they too have to eat - and a lack of oil revenues can make that difficult (blockade might help revolution).

3) The Iranian people don't seem to care. Again, this is an issue a blockade and monetary issue *could* help fix. To get a democratic and liberal revolution you need mass support.

On the other side, there are some tremendously positive factors:

1) The regime is widely hated.

2) The mainline Iranian army itself is a threat to the regime. They are not trusted by the regime, and they are already somewhat equipped with arms. They can give us a tool to physically support any revolt and handle the aftermath.

3) There is a strong pre-Islamic nationalist tradition. People continue with the fire festivals, despite them being totally illegal.

4) Of course, oil is a weak spot economically.

To me, this points to a revolutionary effort driven not by this group or that group (although we should be funding them all). Rather it points to an effort driven by the U.S. using one of our greatest skills - marketing and propaganda. As a multi-point plan, by order of execution, we can:

1) Hearken back to the roots of Persian tradition in propaganda films, satellite news services, our radio services etc... No more playing pop hits, play Persian music - perhaps updated by exiled musicians - but music banned by the regime. Add in the ideas of religious liberalism in good measure.

2) Pursuing contacts (and buying them) with the mid-level leadership of the army. Just funding this guys can make their lives and their soldiers lives much easier. The added necessity of hiding their newfound wealth can further distance them from the regime. Work with the Mossad on this - they have better Persian contacts than we do - and they are liked far more than the British (who used to have great contacts).

3) Fund revolutionary groups and insert them into the country (like Lenin was injected) to cause trouble)

4) Blockade, but at the same time very clearly push the idea that this is limited to the Islamic regime and we respect and support Persia

5) Create an official policy of removing the senior leadership as Israel did with Hamas. This is to force them into hiding and weaken their ability to stay in front of things.

6) Wait. Never fly a single plane over Iran, never move a single soldier in. Maintain clearly that Iran is off-limits for our military - although assassins might still work there, they are not there to establish control – and they should probably be Persian themselves.

It is aggressive, but it is not quite war. And I think it is the best chance we have of fomenting revolt and resolving this issue to our own advantage and the advantage of the world as a whole.

Happiness,

Joseph

2006-12-10T23:44:00.000-08:00

There was a very interesting article about leftists and Islamists joining forces in the WSJ today. While these two groups seem like very unlikely allies, viewed through the prism of Religious Liberalism they are actually quite similar. They both fit on the unfree side of the Liberty and Religious matrix. My feeling is that where they have victories - and one of them does not totally dominate the other - they will kill each other to achieve supremacy. Think communist-inclined school teachers in Afghanistan being slaughtered. That said, to defeat the very powerful ideas of freedom - they will go to tremendous lengths. To counter this force, Religious Liberalism - freedom with the vigor of faith - must be strengthened.

2006-11-04T16:32:00.000-08:00

For some reason, I was dreaming about Iraq on Friday night.

It seems to me that certain streams of Islam are totally incompatible with liberal democracy (no surprise there). The question Western societies have (and Iraq too) is how to deal with these streams of Islam. If their Imams call for murder (or their flock participates in it), then they can be arrested - but that is often too little too late. The Imams from these groups know it, and so know how to say what they want to say while dancing around these rules. I know it sounds a little radical, but I wouldn't mind extending the limits on speech and religion in this case. I would argue that any church that preaches certain illiberal concepts (primarily unequal rights for different classes of citizens) ought to be censored in some way.

You can then put a cap on radical groups, like the Muslim Brotherhood and its many children, while allowing other streams to grow and succeed.

There are two sides to the separation of church and state. In the US, the state can't have any involvement in churches. But isn't it reasonable to say that the church ought not try to fundamentally change the liberal nature of the state?

Thoughts?

Joseph

2006-10-05T17:25:00.000-07:00

This is a response to the question: "Can military coups be a good idea sometimes, even in democratic countries?"

Sure, democracy can go overboard - to survive there must be liberty. A military regime *can* provide far more liberty than a democratic one. The Palestinian government would be a great example of a democracy without any freedoms. From what I've heard Allende was going down the same track. So is Chavez. All 'democratic', none 'liberal.' Thailand? I'm withholding judgement. Thaksin was corrupt, but was his regime becoming illiberal on any substantive level?

2006-09-28T14:06:00.000-07:00

Here's a religious post. It is related to religious liberalism, but not terribly topical :)

"Joseph's Irregular Vort: It isn't necessarily relevant to the parsha, topical or even learned..."

There is a general prohibition (it isn't a simple prohibition, there are allowances and exceptions) of not anthropomorphizing Hashem. Yehuda Ha-levi (in the Kuzari) has a very interesting take on this prohibition. He doesn't object to giving G-d form in words per-se, he simply says that it is inappropriate. Hashem is pure essence, pure soul. To paraphrase, the Kuzari asks, "Would you describe your own soul with a head or arms or legs?" It clearly doesn't fit. The soul lacks all these things and is not in any way lacking because of it. It is like describing a number and saying it has arms and legs. It is not only incorrect, it is irrelevant.

I thought, at one point, that the above would be the perfect entry point to the real things I want to discuss. The friction, perhaps, between the individual and the community. How it was supposed to be an entry point, I no longer know, so here's another attempt.

Adam Smith describes two kinds of rulers. One is the Man of System and the other is the Wise Ruler. The Man of System is a central planner. He believes so strongly in his system of government that he believes he can move people as easily as chess pieces on a board to make them fit his conception of government. Smith's Wise Ruler, on the other hand, is benevolent and recognizes the self-motivating aspects of humanity and satisfies himself with general regulations and systems that moderate the most destructive of humans and their impulses.

As a Jew, the question I have is, how does Jewish society fit into the picture? How do we relate to G-d? To Rabbis? To our peers?

Now, each approach (particularly the Man of System) carries a great deal of intellectual baggage - baggage that is carried through into Jewish tradition.

The Man of System envisages a government with very detailed top-down control that is organized for the good of society as a whole and that maximizes individual happiness because that is, naturally, what individuals desire. This is like the Tragedy of the Commons – where limited resources risk being overexploited when access to them is not managed collectively – being extended to everything. In a standard example, a fisherman will have an incentive to catch as many fish as he can – as will all of his neighbors. Without collective control and management the result will be overfishing and a tragedy for all of the fishermen.

In more standard Torah models, which are slightly different, a man is better off helping his whole city fortify its walls than just fortifying his own home (which will prove useless in an assault). A community of sailors is better off forcing the individual not to drill a hole in his own bunk (and sinking them all). The believers in the man of system extend this to everything. And because the individual benefits through this sort of external control, the ultimate benefit is derived from total control over everything. The individual may not recognize it, but he or she is better off *and* the community is better off, if their actions are set. This concept is extremely common both in Jewish and non-Jewish thought. Ask anybody what their picture of the time of Moshiach is. They'll describe a world in harmony - a world where, while people keep their free will, it is rendered meaningless because they want to keep G-d's word. Sure, people will have different parts, but they will all sing together for the greater good and for their own. Disagreement, even for the sake of heaven, would be destruction.

The question I have is (and I'm not trying to be heretical here), did the Rabbonim who believed and laid down this approach do it because it was the dominant intellectual tradition for thousands of years (Smith's Wise Man system had not yet been established) or did they do it because were they inspired by Hashem to adhere to Plato's model of society? To what extent (and limited by the extent to which I have understanding of Jewish tradition) is our relationship to Hashem and our Rabbis like our relationship to a Man of System and his enforcers? Or to what extent is Hashem Smith's Wise Ruler, and the Rabbinical system simply his medium and system for moderating and directing our activities?

The Kuzari describes the man who fortifies only his own home. He explains that for the benefit of the community, a man must give to the communal defense - and it will be both cheaper and more effective for him to do so. He then does a very strange thing. He extends the Tragedy of the Commons model and says that we give to our communities and build community strength not only through charity and tithes, but through certain actions (Shabbos, holidays, jubilee etc...), certain words (prayers, blessings and thanksgivings) and through certain midot (character traits like love, fear, joy). I asked some Rabbis at the Kollel about this (and discussed everything with my mom) but it was a challenging question. Interestingly, each Rabbi targeted a different area as somehow problematic. And those areas were the areas I would more closely identify them with. One targeted the midot and wondered how they would be communal and the other targeted the blessings. For the midot the answer was (I believe) a quote: "Because you did not serve the Lord thy God in joy... you shall serve your enemies)." Having joy when serving Hashem has communal impact. It is therefore clear that joy (and also fear and love) should be communal. For the blessings Rabbi, the answer was that when you say a blessing you bring holiness down into the world and this benefits the community - and this would be extended to the other areas. As a side note, prayer would seem to be communal by nature (the bulk of the references are to us, not to me) - but the Rabbis wrote the prayers and so they actually set it up to be so.

I certainly appreciated the analyses, but neither of them really did it for me. Neither was quite an all-encompassing answer to the question which I would phrase as: "How do you apply the Tragedy of the Commons to holidays, blessings and midot?"

The implication of the Kuzari's comparison is that:
1) On the one hand participating in Shabbos, brachot (okay, okay brachos), and love of Hashem requires less effort as a community and delivers more spiritual strength.
2) On the other hand, if one person is not participating in Shabbos, brachot and love of Hashem, the entire endeavor can be sunk. The community bears responsibility for the individual.

A little while later, in the same chapter, the Kuzari talks of the holy individual - the pious one. Of course, he circulates in this community, he works in this world - this is the Jewish model. But then he goes a step further and says (to paraphrase): "Imagine how holy this man would be if he were in the land of Israel in the time of our great man surrounded by and interacting with other holy people." The implication is quite strong that holiness is best established in community and reinforced by it. And by being both holy and by interacting with others you lower your own barriers to encountering Hashem while enhancing your reward. Likewise, a single individual can undermine the whole operation. It is taught that if a man committed manslaughter and had to flee to a City of Refuge, the community Rabbi had to flee as well. The shortcoming in the man that led to the accident was a shortcoming in the community and in the leadership.

So, the Tragedy of the Commons is extended to spiritual matters. It seems like it is extended to all spiritual matters - and certainly to the ones that the Kuzari regards as the source and bases of all mitzvot (Love of G-d, Fear of G-d and Joy in G-d). In a community, the individual benefits most spiritually when contributing to the spiritual strength of the community.

Now, while the Kuzari refers to Plato - he makes one very very substantial deviation from him. He refers not to an enforced obligation to serve the community - but to a duty. He implies a free will to participate or not. This is *not* the Platonic model.

So going back to our original question, is Judaism a religion with a Man of System (G-d) or a religion with a Wise Leader (still G-d).

Before we go on, a standard critique of the Man of System is that he cannot know enough to run society by his system. There isn't enough data, things aren't predictable enough etc... This critique does not apply to Hashem. He does know enough. But he can still choose not to be a Man of System.

The Kuzari's path is clear. Any disagreement, even for the sake of Hashem, is hugely destructive. It says: "heterodoxy, I mean the splitting of opinions, is the beginning of the corruption of a religion."

In my opinion (as limited a weight as it carries), the classic model that Judaism is based on ultimately achieving this Man of System society is flawed. The key item is the Kuzari's Free Will. The Man of System ignores free will. But Hashem has clearly given it to us. In Hashem's model we operate more as independent and competitive agents (like elements in an ecosystem) than as cogs in a machine. Even more mechanistic plant life and geology are better understood as independent and competitive agents – and they totally lack free will. But perhaps Hashem is looking for a combo-deal? Most would argue that Hashem desires that we use our free will (ecosystem model) to move towards a society that actually functions harmoniously with a Platonic perfection (the classic, but flawed model for the operation of the human body as controlled entirely by the brain [see Chana Cox, Until Shiloh Comes])? Perhaps Hashem is seeking the most blessed of combinations: A humanity with free will that forms the perfect G-d worshipping machine?

This is certainly the description that comes from our understanding of Moshiach.

It does seem that this model applies to a part of the community. Kohanim are designated to a machine-like life. They have certain activities pre-determined for them, they dress identically and are to act identically, they are insulated from economics and variability of life through tithes, their lives are basically pre-ordained to a remarkable degree, with the biggest part of variety coming through lots to determine who does what service. Note, THEY do not determine what service they do. The lots do – in other words, Hashem does. For the Kohanim, G-d is to be largely if not entirely a Man of System. But what of the rest of us? Is this our ideal? Are we to melt indistinguishably into the collective?

Rav Kook once said that Halacha is like a house in the field. In the whole picture, the house is important, no doubt, but it only covers a small area. Halacha, likewise, only covers a small area of life and of goodness. Beyond the house (which is small) is a whole field of opportunity for individual expression of the relationship with Hashem. His ideas open up the concept of Hashem (even in the time of Moshiach) being a Wise Ruler and not a Man of System. Under this model, Halacha and Rabbis are general mechanisms for moderating our evil inclinations and steering us in a good direction. But what we do beyond that is still up to us.

Smith's Wise Ruler sets up mechanisms and general rules. Within those, there is competition and feedback. In other words, these are adaptive systems, like ecosystems. They adapt to changes in circumstance, and they adapt to changes in the actions of others.

Perhaps, Hashem is really the Wise Ruler with the capability to be a Man of System. He relates to the angels and to a great extent to the priests as a Man of System. But he respects and establishes our free will, enabling us to relate to him as we would to Smith's Wise Ruler. I like to compare Hashem to an author. There are characters in a book. The good author will recognize those characters have their own motivations and allow them to be true and realistic and act in ways that the author did not foresee. The characters have their own souls and free wills and if you are not true to them, your book won't be very good. I have, many a time, rewritten an entire plot (with the same outcome, generally) because a single character didn't do what I expected them to at a key point. G-d, of course, is a very good author (the perfect one) and knows us perfectly, but he still allows us (with a few exceptions) to make our own path.

Sure, in the time of Moshiach many things will be set and we will follow them, but our free will is not meaningless. We would *STILL* exercise choice, and not just choose the single good path. We may not exercise choice between good and evil, but we can still exercise choice between good and good. Yes, there is only one Hashem, the ultimate good - but there are many expressions of it. We may not be motivated by hatred, resentment, greed and lust - but we can still be motivated by Love, Fear and Joy. The world's feedback mechanisms, the world's concept of balance and competing goods, might very well continue to function. But competition would be between midot, between the mitzvot beyond locked-down halacha, between ideas and approaches to bringing kavod (honor) to our King, holiness to our world and pleasure to our fellow man.

Perhaps.

The result would be not a harmony of voices each singing their own part of a choir-like whole. The result would be more like a Beit Midrash; A host of different conversations filling our world with holiness and love.

The Kuzari says that in this world we are like small parcels of land. If we get rain it is because all of the land around us deserves rain as well. If we are dry, it is because those around us do not deserve rain and so we cannot receive it. In the world to come, we merit more individual judgement. But here, community is important.

Communities have a ruach and a spirit. That ruach can be poisoned by an individual, or made great by many individual interactions.

In the coming year, I wish that all of you contribute to your communities - through tzedakah, through prayer and blessing, through Shabbos and through love, fear and joy.

May you choose good and may the spirit and rewards of holiness flow through your lives and your communities.

Happiness,

Joseph
p.s. Please feel free to disagree :)

References:
Chana Cox, Liberty, G-d’s Gift to Humanity
Chana Cox and Rebecca Becker, www.religiousliberalism.org
Chana Cox, Until Shiloh Comes
Rabbi Yehuda Ha-levi, The Kuzari
A couple of Rabbis at Kollel Beit HaTalmud, Melbourne
Harav Yehuda Amital, The Ethical Foundations Of Rav Kook's Nationalist Views

2006-08-23T07:33:00.000-07:00

Another comment on PubliusPundit:

...The fact is, the paper doesn’t matter much. What matters are the facts on the ground.

A President, no matter what his official powers, is only commander of the armed forces so long as the armed forces allow him to be. In the US, we’ve managed to keep our armed forces in check and free of direct political aspiration. But in most of the world this isn’t the reality.

About the only thing that winning an election provides in a country like the Congo is a demonstration of your popular support or ability to game the system. It does not actually measure power. Oh, and it also allows you to levy taxes - again, only if you already have real power from sources other than the voting booth and a few scraps of paper.

IMO, a country like the Congo has a multiplicity of forces at play. It isn’t just two groups duking it out - although they did form two parties for the purpose of civil war. There were 30 candidates for President for a reason. In these situations, often the most stable and promising solution is to minimize the central power. Eliminate the standing army and the taxes that go with it. With a bi-polar society that would spell all out war, but with a multi-polar society accomodations will quickly be achieved. There will be no possibility of conquering everything and so things will calm down.

The multiplication of faction, as discussed by Madison in the Federalist Papers, is key to true stability.

See Chapter 6 of ReligiousLiberalism.org for more on this.

2006-08-22T07:51:00.000-07:00

There has been a bit of a crazed reaction to President Bush's use of the term 'Islamic Fascists' because it associates Islam with the terror and violence being threated around the world.

Aside from the obvious issues, namely to deny that the war on terror is originating from fanatical Muslims is just plain weird, I think it is a valuable term.

Whether he knows it or not, Bush clearly thinks within the matrix suggested by Religious Liberalism. Namely, you have religious liberals (like himself), religious totalitarians (or fascists), secular liberals and secular totalitarians.

By branding these Muslim radical as Islamic Fascists he has clearly placed them in one camp - and not his. It is, IMO, a perfect term. It is particularly useful because it does more than identify a group. You could just call them Islamic Terrorists/Militants/Resistance etc... What this term does, and why it has rankled so many feathers, is that is identifies the true nature of the threat. It isn't just terror per se (like anarchy driven terror), it is a belief in totalitarian government as defined by religious law - and terror as a tool to achieve that.

These terrorists wouldn't be nearly so threatening if all they wanted to do was blow up some buses so a strip of land would be given to them. What these terrorists want is the establishment of an Islamic state - EVERYWHERE. It is Islamic Fascism - a great term that hits the nail on the head.

2006-08-07T02:45:00.000-07:00

Thinking about the world today, I think it would be quite valuable to do a map of religious liberalism. A definition of battle-lines if you'd like. It would be based on four criteria.

Individual Freedom. This would be from the Heritage list, it is centered on economic not political freedom, but is very well compiled.)
Social Power of Religion. This is a good thing, the moral power of religion (whether Shinto or Xtian or Jewish, providing an anchor for society. This would be based on subjective analysis.
Physically Coercive Power of Religion. This is a bad thing. It could be subjectively measured by state-imposed religion (Iran or Saudi Arabia being prime examples) or on religion with state-like powers (honor killings in Jordan or perhaps secratarian violence against religious minorities, for example).

By combining these three elements we could map the world by four broad classes and various shades. They would include:

Religious liberal states (US, Japan?, Eastern Europe...)
Secular liberal states (Netherlands, Canada?...)
Secular communal states (North Korea, Cuba, France?, Germany?...)
Religious communal states (Saudi Arabia, Iran etc....)

It is my position that this analysis could develop into a stunning map of the ideological battelines facing the world today. Care to help me carry it out?

Joseph

2006-07-25T21:12:00.000-07:00

A comment I posted on Publius Pundit regarding Israel and its neighbors:

****
Let me take your points one by one:

1) What is a liberal democracy and why doesn't Palestine qualify?

Palestine is a democracy. But it is not liberal. Liberal, quite literally, means free. People have freedoms. There are lots of cases of unfree democracies (African nations are a prime example) where the majority dictates everything - and so elections turn violent or lose peace-making impact, because the loser can lose everything. Palestine is not liberal. Individuals have no guaranteed rights. Imagine being a Jew living in Gaza under a Palestinian government? Sadly, Israel is not as liberal as it should be. There is effectively a sliding scale of liberty and Israel is lower than it should be. Freedom House, as pointed out above, does a fairly good job of this. While they do have guaranteed rights, Arabs in Israel are disadvantaged, particularly when it comes to government funding. This points, in my mind, to a need for less government funding all around - so that elections are not about patronage. More critically, not even Jews in Israel have a right to free speech, freedom of assembly or a variety of basic rights. For the most part they get them and the Supreme Court does a fairly good job of this, but there is no liberal constitution. In fact, you can have a pretty liberal state that is not democratic. It is rare, but I would point to British Hong Kong as a prime example. Check out www.religiousliberalism.org for lots more info.

2) Religious movements work against unIslamic regimes. Some governments support these, some oppose them. Why do I point to governments being the cause of terror?

All the Arab governments have fostered and supported terror. They only object when it is pointed at them. They cultivate an acceptance of the tools and aims of terror and then complain when it is refocused on them. Egypt allowed (and supported) the fedayeen, Saudi Arabia allowed and supported Al Qaeda. Wahabi Islam is core to the political set up. Jordan, Lebanon and Syria all fell into the same categories. Now Al Qaeda is anti-Saud, so the Saudis no longer support them. But it sure took a while - until well after 9/11. The Brotherhood is a special example. I believe they pre-date the modern Egyptian state. But have you noticed that there is basically no Turkish Brotherhood? The nations are about as old as one another. But one chose a path that did not support terror in any of its forms. They are dealing with essentially foreign terrorists (Kurds and Al Qaeda), not Turkish movements. My basic point, these states provided fertile ground for terror (against the British, Americans and Jews) and encouraged its mentality. They are not simply victims and it is not simply a mass phenomenon.

4) Large income inequality leads to angry poor who rally to Islam and terrorism

Ah yes. That's why we see so many rocket attacks on the US from Mexico. That's why we see so many cross border raids to kill American ranchers. Clearly income inquality is the core issue. It's amazingthe US isn't in a perpetual state of revolution. I mean there are a group of people at the top who have more money than the average American could make in 100,000 years. Don't you want to kill them?

Folks, it isn't about poverty. It is about freedom, and in this case, religion. Mexicans are freer in their own lands than Arabs. They are freer, even though many are not even legal residents, in the US. The special spices of mideast terrorism are Islam and a lack of liberty. I should note that people would call the massive African slaughters terrorism, except nobody cares about Africans. A million Congolese die, many massacred civilians, and it barely makes the news. There is terror there too. In the mideast, you also have Islam. Sadly, Islam is dedicated to a religious communalist vision which tends to lead to repression, death and war. Islam and nationalist Marxism (the only secular vision to take hold there) have created poverty and terror - not the other way around. The solution is to offer another vision. The Turks have secular communalism (as do the French), the Netherlands have pure secular liberalism, and the US offers religious liberalism. It is a war of ideas.

But in this war, it is the ideas that have created the conditions, not the conditions which have created the ideas.

2006-07-25T19:56:00.000-07:00

The War on Terror is a war of ideologies. The terrorists have a fundamental belief in a religious communalist society. It is a model that's been tried a few times before and it tends to lead to repression, death and war (see European history). I believe in a religious liberal society (www.religiousliberalism.org). A religious liberal is committed both to his or her religion and to the belief that governments are established primarily for the protection of individual liberty and human rights. I think it is a model that recognizes and leverages the power of religion while unleashing the creative and positive forces of freedom.

This blog is being created, by my mom and I, to discuss religious liberalism. It is a companion to her book "Liberty, God's Gift to Humanity" and the associated web site www.religiousliberalism.org.

Keep tuned.